



Identifying Critical Assets for Risk Management

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






Problem

- Technology
 - Interconnected
 - Sophisticated
 - Integral
- Complex SDLC Ecosystem
- Evolving Threats
- Constant Change
- \$\$\$





NIST IR 8179: Criticality Analysis Process Model

- Method for identifying and prioritizing information systems and components
 - Increase understanding of the organization's IT/OT (and other) assets
 - Better decision making
 - risk management
 - project management
 - acquisition, maintenance, and upgrade
 - Informed distribution of finite resources





Not Another...

- Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
- Business Continuity Planning
- FIPS Level / Classification
- Framework (RMF, CSF, etc.)

LEVERAGES AND INFORMS EXISTING PRACTICES – NOT DUPLICATING IT










Reading the Model




ID	
Name	
Description	
Inputs	
Outputs	
Roles & Responsibilities	(Process only)
Methods	(Sub-process only)
Related Processes	





Criticality Analysis Process








Process A: Define & Scope

- Define:
 - Who
 - When
 - How

Tailor if needed for each analysis








Process B: Program-Level Analysis

- 1. Goals, assumptions, constraints, etc.
- 2. Activities
- 3. Dependencies
- 4. Operating States
- 5. Baseline Criticality Levels








Process C: System/Subsystem-Level Analysis

- 1. Scope
- 2. Functions
- 3. Dependencies
- 4. Operating States
- 5. Baseline Criticality Level








Process D: Component/ Subcomponent-Level Analysis

- 1. Scope
- 2. Functions
- 3. Diagram
- 4. Operating States
- 5. Baseline Criticality Levels










Process E: Traceback

- Identify connections
 & dependencies
- 2. Identify Existing Controls
- 3. Review Impact of Operating States
- 4. Apply Risk Info
- Final Criticality Level







Things to Note

- Iterates throughout
- Analyses are hierarchical
 - Multiple hierarchies of systems (of systems of systems of systems)
 - begin at a high level and repeat at a lower level until desired detail is reached
- FLEXIBLE
 - Meant to work <u>with</u> existing processes, not to replace or duplicate









Related Work

Cyber-Supply Chain Risk Management

csrc.nist.gov/scrm

FISMA

csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Risk-Management

Cybersecurity Framework

www.nist.gov/cyberframework





Questions?

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